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ABSTRACT
A Hybrid Approach to Fault Diagnosis in Teams of Autonomous Systems
Hanieh Agharazi, M.A.Sc.
Concordia Unviersity, 2013
Discrete event systems (DES) are dynamical systems equipped with a discrete
state set and an event driven state transition structure. An event in a DES occurs
instantaneously causing transition from one state to another. DES models have
emerged to provide a formal treatment of many man-made systems such as auto-
mated manufacturing systems, computer systems, communication networks and air
traﬃc control systems.
In this thesis, we study fault diagnosis in teams of autonomous systems. In
particular, one consider a team of two spacecraft in deep space. The spacecraft coop-
erate with each other in leader-follower formation ﬂying. Formation ﬂying demon-
strates the capability of spacecraft to react to each other in order to maintain a
desired relative distance autonomously without human intervention. In the system
considered here, instruments (actuators and sensors) may fail and cause error. Be-
cause of the communication delays in deep space, each entity should be able to
diagnose the failure and decide how to reconﬁgure itself.
Basically, fault diagnosis in such systems requires information exchange be-
tween the autonomous elements of the team. The exchanged information for exam-
ple may include position and velocity data. Our goal in the thesis is to propose a
method for fault diagnosis with reduced information exchange. One solution is to
transmit only discrete event information between autonomous systems. Transmis-
sion of discrete event data occurs less frequently than the transmission of continuous
streams of data. The discrete event data may include high level supervisory com-
mands issued every now and then and discretized values of continuous data that
iii
are transmitted only when a continuous-variable data (such as angle or accelera-
tion) crosses the threshold. The fault diagnosis scheme proposed in this thesis is an
adaptation of hybrid fault diagnosis for distributed autonomous systems.
This system is simulated using MATLAB/SIMULINK Software and DECK
Toolbox. We examined diﬀerent maneuvers for spacecraft and investigated the eﬀect
of faults on the overall system and the performance of our designed fault diagnoser.
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Fault Diagnosis plays an important role in protecting life and property, and increas-
ing reliability and productivity [28]. Therefore, it is of great importance in machinery
and management systems such as transportation systems (such as aerospace, auto-
mobile), industrial production facilities (i.e. power plant, water treatment plant),
household appliances (washer, dryer). In these systems, there are extensive amount
of sensors with diﬀerent types of signals and large number of operational modes.
This makes them computationally complex systems and also makes fault diagnosis
a really challenging problem. The main issue is the to develop systematic fault de-
tection and isolation techniques to increase the accuracy and reliability along with
reducing the cost of maintenance and revisions. As a result, a considerable amount
of research has been conducted on fault diagnosis (e.g. [29], [30], [31], [33], [34]).
The behavior of many complex systems, such as spacecraft, can be described
in terms of continuous and discrete modes. As a result, they require modeling tools
that take into account both of these charactristics and their interactions. Hybrid
system models have been developed extensively for modeling such complex systems.
In hybrid systems, the dynamics in every mode evolve continuously until a
transition takes the system to a diﬀerent mode of operation. This transition may
1
take place autonomously as a result of the continuous evolution of system variables
or because of a discrete event such as a supervisory command. These systems have
been used extensively by researchers in diﬀerent engineering ﬁelds, as a modeling
tool, for developing algorithms in many domains such as control, data management
and fault diagnosis (see, e.g. [35], [36], [37], [38], [39]).
In this thesis, we consider fault diagnosis in teams of autonomous systems
and in particular a team of two spacecraft in formation ﬂying. We would like the
spacecraft to maintain a desired formation as they are deployed in deep space.
The components in the spacecraft may fail. In this distributed system, in order
to increase the autonomy, each spacecraft should be able to do the diagnosis itself
and decide its next move based on the controller commands and diagnosis results.
For the purpose of fault diagnosis, a huge amount of information may have to be
exchanged between the members of the formation ﬂying. In this work, we propose
a new method to decrease the volume of information exchange by transmitting only
the discrete event information to the other members of the team. For example, the
discretized acceleration and orientation data are to be sent to the other spacecraft
to be used for fault diagnosis. This will reduce the amount of exchanged data since
we transmit acceleration and orientation data when they cross certain thresholds.
In the following, we brieﬂy review the research conducted in the literature as
related to the work in this thesis.
1.1 Literature Review
1.1.1 Formation Flying
Formation ﬂying is used to describe the behavior of a set of more than one space-
craft that collaboratively work together as an alternative to a single, larger and
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more expensive spacecraft. Cooperative smaller set of spacecraft has many bene-
ﬁts over a single one including simpler designs, higher redundancy due to cheaper
replacements and also improved reliability, reduced cost and increased mission per-
formance. However, these beneﬁts come with a new set of challenges such as relative
navigation, control and fault diagnosis [9]. The concept of formation ﬂying has been
studied extensively in the literature with applications to the coordination of multiple
robots [10], [11], unmanned aerial vehicles [12], [13] and satellites [8].
Formation ﬂying can be divided into two main categories based on the am-
bient dynamic environment: Deep Space (DS) and Planetary Orbital Envi-
ronments (POE). In deep space the formation is in heliocentric orbit rather than
earth orbit. In this case, the formation ﬂying control focus on the tracking of space-
craft relative position and attitude [16]. On the other hand, in POE, the spacecraft
are around the earth orbit and thus they are subject to signiﬁcant environmental
disturbances. In our work, we consider formation ﬂying in deep space and assume
that the earth gravity is negligible.
The control architecture plays a key role in the performance of the formation.
According to [17] in spacecraft formation ﬂying at least two of them use an active
control scheme to maintain the relative positions. An alternative deﬁnition is given
in [8] where formation ﬂying is deﬁned as a set of more than one spacecraft in which
any of spacecraft dynamic states are coupled through a common control law. This
deﬁnition is completed with two conditions: at least one spacecraft must (I) track
a desired state proﬁle relation to another member, and (II) the associated control
law should, at the minimum, depend upon the state of this other member. This
common control law can be understood as the formation ﬂying control.
The formation ﬂying control architectures have been classiﬁed in the litera-
ture into ﬁve main categories based on the topology of communication between the
spacecraft controllers as follows [8].
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• Multi-Input/Multi-Output: Controllers are designed based on the dy-
namic model of the entire formation. Therefore, the formation is considered
as a multi-input, multi-output plant.
• Leader-Follower: In this architecture one spacecraft, referred to as the
leader, moves based on its own absolute position and the others, known as the
followers, move based on their relative position with respect to the leader. This
architecture is also known as Chief-Deputy, Master-Slave or Target-Chase.
• Virtual Structure: This architecture considers all spacecrafts as rigid bodies
embedded in a large virtual body. The whole motion of the system takes into
account each individual spacecraft’s motion in order to determine the whole
rigid body motions.
• Behavioral Architecture: In this method , there is no globally accepted def-
inition of a primitive behavior according to [18]. Instead, each spacecraft is
designed to have its own objective and behavior. The outputs of multiple con-
trollers are then combined together to form a control signal with consideration
of the behavioral diﬀerence among the spacecraft.
• Cyclic: The formation is similar to the Leader-Follower architecture in the
sense that each spacecraft has its individual controller but it is diﬀerent in
the sense that they are not in a hierarchical arrangement. The motion of each
spacecraft is controlled with respect to its neighbors, not with respect to the
leader.
Leader-Follower is the most studied formation ﬂying architecture among the meth-
ods mentioned above. In our work, we consider a group of spacecrafts in formation
ﬂying with this control architecture.
In practice, it is desired to minimize the amount of communication among the
spacecraft, as the data transmission and communication delay are grave issues in
4
deep space applications. Therefore, it is better to have some form of decentralization
in control structure which has a lower communication requirement.
On the other hand, one of the main issues in all the mentioned architectures
is the autonomy and robustness to faults in the formation. The system needs to
ﬁrst detect and isolate the presence and location of any faults, and then recover by
reconﬁguring the controllers.
One of the common methods of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) is the
design of detection ﬁlters or using observers such as ’Luenberger Observers ’ in a
deterministic setting whose residuals change when a fault occurs in the system [19],
[20], [21]. In the next section an overview of fault diagnosis and the various methods
of FDI are presented.
1.1.2 Fault Diagnosis
The term fault refers to a non permitted derivation of the behavior of components
of the system. A valve becoming stuck-closed, a bias in the sensor readings or a
loose connection in an electric circuit are examples of faults. Faults can be either
permanent or non-permanent. After the occurrence of permanent faults, the
system remains in faulty condition indeﬁnitely while for non-permanent faults, the
system may recover and return to the normal condition. A broken valve can be an
example of a permanent fault and a loose wire in an electrical system may cause a
non-permanent fault.
With the possibility of failure occurrence, Fault Diagnosis (FD) is used
to improve the reliability of a system. A typical fault diagnosis system detects the
faults and isolate the source of failure before it causes a disaster in the system. Fault
diagnosis techniques are classiﬁed into model-free and model-based methods.
Expert systems and hardware redundancy are two commonly used tech-
niques in model-free methods in which it is diﬃcult to obtain a model for the plant.
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In expert systems, experience and knowledge of experts are stored as rules and
then an inference engine is used for fault diagnosis. Gathering the required ex-
pertise and information for building an expert system is usually diﬃcult and time-
consuming [23], [24]. As a result, there will be no guarantee for the completeness
of the resulting diagnostic rules. However, in cases where models are not easy to
develop expert systems can be very eﬀective. In hardware redundancy, however,
multiple sensors are used to measure the same variable. Their outputs are then
compared and the ﬁnal value for that variable is determined by a voter. In case of
failure, the faulty sensor can be detected by comparing its value with other sensor
values. Although, this method is simple and fairly reliable, it is expensive. Moreover,
it is not suitable for detecting common-cause sensor failures.
In addition to the above model-free methods, several model-based techniques
for fault diagnosis have also been proposed in the literature. In a model-based
method, the observed behavior of the system is compared with the expected behavior
from system model. The condition of the system, normal or faulty, is then concluded
from this comparison. A large class of model-based techniques rely on parameter
estimations and state estimations for continuous variable systems. In these methods,
the system is modeled using diﬀerential and diﬀerence equations [25], [26] and [27].
In the following, we brieﬂy review the model-based techniques which are suitable
for diagnosing failures in Discrete Event Systems (DES).
Fault Diagnosis in Discrete Event Systems
A discrete event system is a dynamic system with discrete input and output, whose
behavior can be described in terms of discrete state transitions. Fault diagnosis in
these systems was prompted by some works in Automatic Control Systems [40], [41],
[42] and Artiﬁcial Intelligence [43]. In [40], Lin proposed a discrete event approach
for fault diagnosis assuming that each component has some normal and faulty states,
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and uses the output at each state for fault diagnosis. In this state-based approach,
a sequence of control commands are issued and the current condition of the system,
normal or faulty, is determined by observing the output of the system. The system
is said to be online-diagnosable if there exists a control sequence that diagnoses the
system. This method is an active state-based diagnosis approach as a sequence of
control commands are generated as the input to the system.
In [31], Hashtrudi Zad et al. proposed a passive on-line method for fault diag-
nosis in DES systems by constructing a fault diagnoser using a state-based approach.
The objective is to use the output sequence to determine the current condition of
the system; normal or faulty. This diagnoser can detect and isolate the failure by
assuming that a failure is diagnosable if it occurs before the diagnoser initialization.
To reduce the number of diagnoser states and the computational complexity of the
diagnoser design, a model reduction method has also been introduced.
In contrast to the above-mentioned methods, there is an event-based ap-
proach proposed by Sampath et al. in [42], [44]. In this method, the diagnoser
does not generate any control commands as the inputs to the system and only relies
on event observations. The faults are assumed to be unobservable. The diagnoser
then acts like a sensor to detect these unobservable faults.
Fault Diagnosis in Continuous-Variable Systems
Models with continuous variables are also studied in literature (see, e.g. [22], [46],
[45], [47], [48], [5]). Most of these approaches rely on Analytical Redundancy where
the expected outputs of the system are obtained analytically based on the mathe-
matical model of the system and then compared with sensors measurements. The
resulting diﬀerence is called the Residual. Probing the value of residuals, one can
determine the presence of a fault. The residual is zero, or close to zero, in the
absence of faults while it will be nonzero if a fault happens [49].
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Parity Space and Fault Detection Filters are two approaches that are used
frequently. Parity approach is based on the consistency test of parity equations and
are built using the mathematical model of the system and the sensor measurements
(see, e.g. [22], [50], [51], [52], [46], [53], [54], [55]). In [50], Chow and Willsky derived
the parity equations from the state space model of the system. One can detect the
fault from the inconsistency of parity equations. In FD ﬁlter approach, special ﬁlters
are constructed for fault detection and isolation based on both linear (see [5], [56])
and nonlinear system models [6]. In order to decouple the faults, the eﬀects of
diﬀerent faults are mapped into diﬀerent directions/planes and stored in the residual
vector space. Unique fault isolation can then be obtained independent of their
magnitude or the modes (time functions) [22].
Fault Diagnosis in Hybrid Systems
The term hybrid refers to a mixture of two fundamentally diﬀerent forms of dy-
namics, discrete-event and continuous variable (e.g. diﬀerential equation). Some
conventional approaches for fault diagnosis in hybrid systems are based on discrete
abstraction of the continuous dynamics. For instance, in [60], the continuous state
of the system is quantized and discrete methods are applied for fault diagnosis.
In [32], Hashtrudi Zad et al. extended their diagnosis method for DES in [31]
to hybrid automata. They examine the question of whether or not a high-level DES
model contains enough information about the low-level hybrid model by introducing
the notion of consistency and deﬁning a set of suﬃcient conditions for that. These
models are called consistent if the analysis and design based on the high-level and
low-level models yield to the same result. An output, from a set of symbols, is
assigned for each state of the hybrid automata and are assumed to be constant at
any discrete mode.
In [57], the hybrid fault diagnosis is performed by hybrid structure hypothesis
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testing. In this case, the occurrence of a fault can be sensed by measuring system
variables at the time the faults occur and signaling this occurrence by observable
events. Two diagnosers are designed for continuous and DES levels of the system.
If an event is observed, the DES level diagnoser generates a discrete state estimate
of the system. The continuous level diagnoser will then perform hypothesis tests,
for example residual tests, of the discrete state estimate and generates sub-diagnosis
statements regarding the faults at the continuous dynamics. The ﬁnal diagnosis
statement is then produced by a decision logic unit. In [57], it is implicitly assumed
that discrete events occurring in the system are observable which cannot be held in
many control applications.
As an example of a two level hybrid fault diagnosis, consider the system in [58].
The authors developed a hybrid fault diagnosis method for a team of UAVs using
the cooperative characteristics of a team of agents to detect and isolate the faults.
Their system consist of two fault diagnosis units: a low-level, agent level, which uses
the classical diagnosis techniques and a high-level, team level, which is formulated
in the DES framework. First, the state space equations for aircrafts are linearized.
Linear observers are then formulated and residuals are generated such that when
there are no faults, the residuals generated by the observer will approach to zero
asymptotically. In their method, they have used semi-decentralized observers for
a more accurate fault detection. However, depending on the team structure, when
the agents’ locations change, some of these semi-decentralized observers might no
longer perform better than fully decentralized ones. Because of this shortcoming,
as a remedy, a high-level DES supervisor uses diﬀerent sets of semi-decentralized
observers to detect the faults according to the existing team structure.
Other approaches for hybrid fault diagnosis are, but not limited to, abstracting
the systems with a Timed Petri-Net Model in [38], abstractions of the continuous
dynamics by Temporal Causal Graphs in ( [59], [61]) and fault diagnosis based on
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Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) in [39].
In this work, we focus on the problem of fault detection and isolation in hybrid
distributed systems. In this thesis, we intend to develop a framework for fault
diagnosis of these systems with minimum communication load between their entities.
Reduction of the communication load has been studied in literature. For
instance, the authors in [14] propose an optimal decentralized fault detection scheme
for a class of discrete time large scale systems with limited network communications
among subsystems by taking the advantage of network communications. Due to the
limited bandwidth of the network, the communications should be limited and usually
only one subsystem can access the network at the same time. As another example,
in [15], the communication load between the entities is lowered by restricting the
communication to only local information in continuous format to improve the time
and cost. In our work, we would like to do the fault diagnosis with minimum
information exchange while using both local and global information.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
As mentioned before, the problem of fault diagnosis in a team of autonomous systems
is studied with the objective of reducing the communication among the members
of the team. A hybrid approach is proposed where local continuous information
along with discrete event information transmitted from other members of the team
are used for fault diagnosis. Transmitting discrete information requires less com-
munication load than sending continuous variable signals. This has the advantage
of reducing the rate of information exchange. The exchanged information could in-
clude supervisory commands and discretized sensor readings (i.e. reporting sensor
reading when it crosses a threshold).
One of the applications of this method could be in ‘Safe Mode’ when minimal
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communication and energy consumption is desirable. Another application is in
systems with restricted communication because of the environmental conditions. In
this thesis, this method is applied to a group of two spacecraft in a Leader-Follower
Formation Flying format with possible failures in the sensors and actuators. To our
knowledge, this approach to reduce the communications has not been explored in
the literature.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2 we describe the method for Hybrid Fault Diagnosis with a simple
example. We start this chapter by a brief introduction on Discrete Event Systems
and Hybrid Modeling. After that, we describe the method of hybrid fault diagnosis
and build a hybrid diagnoser by integrating the continuous-variable and discrete-
event information.
In Chapter 3 we propose our hybrid fault diagnosis framework. Then, we
introduce our system of Formation Flying Spacecraft with translational motion in
one axis and describe the system components and review the dynamics of the system.
The DES models of the system are built and the proposed hybrid fault diagnoser
is made. We test the performance of the proposed method by applying diﬀerent
maneuvers to the system.
In Chapter 4 we consider the case when the spacecraft in the previous chapter
also have rotational movement around a ﬁxed axis. The new system is modeled
and the proposed hybrid diagnosis method is applied to this system. Finally, in




Fault Diagnosis in Hybrid Systems
In this chapter, we apply the fault diagnosis method in hybrid systems in [7]. In
this approach diagnosis is based on both continuous and discrete information. Di-
agnosis purely based on discrete model cannot isolate the failures that result in
small (continuous) changes in the system output. So they have limitations in many
complex systems [2]. On the other hand, a purely continuous approach may lead
to very complex nonlinear relationships that are diﬃcult to analyze. Moreover, due
to the limitations on sensor implementation, some continuous variables may not be
measurable and therefore, fault diagnosis based on purely continuous dynamics may
not be always possible or necessary. In a hybrid approach, the information available
at the DES level are integrated with the information coming from the continuous
dynamics through the continuous sensors.
In this chapter, we explain the method of hybrid fault diagnosis in [7] using
a running example. We ﬁrst begin this chapter by a brief introduction to Discrete
Event Systems (DES) in Section 2.1. We will then present a hybrid system using an
example in Section 2.2 and perform the hybrid fault diagnosis on it in the following
section. We will conclude this chapter by presenting a summary.
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2.1 Discrete Event Systems
Discrete event systems (DES) are dynamical systems equipped with a discrete state
set and an event driven state transition structure. An event in a DES occurs instan-
taneously causing transition from one state to another. DES models have emerged
to provide a formal treatment of many man-made systems such as automated man-
ufacturing systems, computer systems, communication networks, air traﬃc control
systems, integrated transport systems and healthcare systems.
There are several approaches to model a DES such as Finite State Automata
(FSA), Petri Nets, Queuing Networks and Pseudo Codes. Automata theory, [3],
provides one of the most comprehensive sets of mathematical tools for studying
discrete event systems. In this dissertation, we use Moore ﬁnite state automata to
model DES. First we review some basic deﬁnitions and operations on automata.
Languages and Finite State Automata
The dynamics of a discrete event system can be represented by sequences of events.
A sequence is also called a string or a word. The empty string, denoted as  , is a
string without any events. If we consider the set of events as an alphabet, then a
sequence will be a language with words formed from the alphabet. Moreover, the
behavior of a discrete event system can be interpreted as the language that it speaks.
Deﬁnition 1. A language is any set of ﬁnite-length strings, including the empty
sequence, from the events in alphabet Σ.
Given an alphabet Σ, we denote the language that includes the empty string
and any ﬁnite-length string built from alphabet Σ as Σ∗. A language is a set of
sequences; therefore the basic set operations of two languages L1 and L2 such as
intersection (L1 ∩ L2), union (L1∩L2), complement (Lco1 ) and relative complement










Figure 2.1: A simple FSMA.
Languages can be used as a representation for DES behavior. However, it is
diﬃcult to analyze their behavior based on languages. In this case automata are a
better choice.
Deﬁnition 2. A ﬁnite-state Moore automaton (FSMA) G is a six-tuple:
G = (Q,Σ, T,D, λ, q0) (2.1)
where Q is the state set; q0 is the initial state; Σ is the non-empty event set;
T : Q × Σ × Q is the set of transitions; D is the set of discrete outputs and λ : Q
→ D is the output map.
Example 1. A simple FSMA is shown in ﬁgure 2.1. Here, Q = {A,B,C}, Σ
= {a, b, c}, q0 = A, T = {(A, a,B), (B, b, C), (C, a,B), (C, c, A)}, D= {d0, d1.d2},
λ(A) = d0, λ(B) = d1 and λ(C) = d2.
Synchronous Product
The synchronous product of two automata G1 and G2 denoted by G1||G2 or
sync(G1,G2) models the joint operation of automata ( [62], [63]). This is a commu-
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Figure 2.2: Synchronous Product Example: (a) two automata G1 and G2, (b)
sync(G1,G2)
G2 and G3 is deﬁned as:
sync(G1, G2, G3) = sync(G1, sync(G2, G3)) = sync(sync(G1, G2), G3) (2.2)
The synchronous product of more that three automata can be deﬁned similarly.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the synchronous product of two automata G1 and G2.
2.2 Hybrid System Modeling
In this section, we explain the deﬁnition of Hybrid Automata and then describe
a hybrid system with some faults. A hybrid system is a system which is described
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Spacecraft T1 T2 
Figure 2.3: A simple spacecraft with two thrusters.
by continuous and discrete dynamics. This system can be modeled as a hybrid
automata along with its low-level continuous dynamics and high-level DES model.
The following hybrid automata deﬁnition is a modiﬁed form of the deﬁnition in [4]
as explained in [7].
Deﬁnition 3. A Hybrid Automata is a 14-tuple of the form
H = (Q,X,U,Y, FT, Init, S,Σ, T, G, ρ,D, λ, q0) (2.3)
where Q is the set of ﬁnite discrete states; X⊆Rn, U⊆Rp and Y⊆Rr are the set of
vector spaces of continuous state, control input and output, respectively; FT is the
set of m fault types f 1,. . .,fm with f i(t)∈R for 1≤i≤m; Init⊆X is the set of initial
continuous states; S={Sq|q∈Q} is the set of dynamic models deﬁning the continuous
dynamics of the system; Σ is a set of symbols representing the discrete events labeling
the transitions among discrete states; T⊆Q×Σ×Q is the set of discrete transitions;
G:T×X×U→{True;False} is the set of guard conditions; ρ:T×X→X is a reset
map; D is the set of discrete output symbols; λ:Q→D is the discrete output map
and q0 is the initial discrete state.
Figure 2.3 shows a spacecraft with two thrusters. These thrusters could be on
or off moving the spacecraft to the right or left direction on x-axis. They may fail,
thruster T1 may become stuck-on and T2 may become stuck-oﬀ.
The hybrid automaton for this spacecraft is depicted in Figure 2.4. There
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Figure 2.4: A hybrid automaton modeling a spacecraft with two faults.
states for the faulty behavior. Events on/off and on´/off´ correspond to the power
condition of thrusters T1 and T2 respectively. F1 and F2 represent T1’s stuck − on
and T2’s stuck − off faults. We assume that the faults are permanent, i.e. the
system stays in the faulty state indeﬁnitely.
Assume that S is the set of linear systems modeling the spacecraft dynamics at
each discrete state. We can then write Sq, the continuous dynamics at the discrete




X˙(t) = AqX(t) + BqU(t) + LqF (t)



















In the above equation, U(t), F (t) and Lq represent the matrices of thruster power
level (zero/one for on/oﬀ conditions), thrusters failure and the vector of the fault
signatures in the discrete state q, respectively. Also, x(t) is the position of the
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spacecraft and x˙(t) is the spacecraft velocity. The output y1(t) is the position and
the output y2(t) is the velocity of the spacecraft. Therefore, overall, the hybrid
model contains an automaton (DES abstraction) in Figure 2.4 plus the continuous
variable models in Eq. (2.4) and (2.5).
2.3 Diagnosis of Hybrid Automata
In this section, we describe a hybrid fault diagnosis method for hybrid automata [7].
In this method, the diagnosis is performed by integrating the information from the
continuous sensors of the system with the information from discrete sensors at the
DES level. In this approach, based on the continuous dynamics of the system, a
bank of Residual Generators (isolators) are designed to isolate the fault types at
the continuous level by producing a residual using the continuous input and output
of the system. In [5] and [6], the solvability conditions for the existence of residual
generators for fault isolation in linear and nonlinear dynamical systems have been
studied.
The framework for designing the diagnoser for this method of fault diagnosis is
depicted in Figure 2.5. First, the DES abstraction of residual generator is generated.
It will then be integrated with the DES abstraction of the system to construct the
Extended DES Abstraction (EDEAS) of the system and isolators. The hybrid
diagnoser will be then designed based on the EDESA as described in the following
steps:
1. Residual generators (isolators) are described by DES models.
2. Appropriate self-loop transitions are added to the DES abstraction of the
system (Habs) to make the transitions in isolator’s DES model consistent with
the system’s transition model.
3. We assume that the system stays at each discrete state long enough so that
18
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Residual Generators 
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Output of the 
Extended DES 
Abstraction
Figure 2.5: The schematic of the hybrid diagnosis framework
the transient response dies out. This assumption is enforced by having each
isolator event happen between the occurrence of any two consecutive events
in the system.
4. EDESA is constructed by synchronous product of the DES models in steps 1
to 3.
5. Finally, the diagnoser is built based on the EDESA from the previous step
using a diagnoser design for discrete-event models.
In the following, we apply these steps to our previous example of the simple space-
craft with two thrusters.
Step 1 - Modeling of Isolators
The isolators are designed by taking the continuous input and output of the system
and producing a residual vector to isolate some fault types from the others while
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Figure 2.6: System dynamics and Isolator in state q
the system is in one of the discrete states. This is shown in the block diagram in
Figure 2.6. This ﬁgure shows the continuous dynamics of the system in discrete
state q along with the isolator Is for that state. We assume that at the beginning
the isolators are initialized at zero. They will remain at zero as long as no fault
is present in the system. If a failure occurs, they will change to a nonzero signal.
The discretized value of the isolators is 0 when normal and 1 when the fault has
occurred. The design procedure of isolators is outside the scope of this thesis. The
reader could refer to [5], [6] and [7] for more details.
The designed isolators are then modeled as a ﬁnite state Moore automaton
with two states of ZERO and ONE. In our spacecraft example, there are two faults
of F1 and F2. Therefore, there will be two isolators, Is1 and Is2, used for detection
and isolation of the respected faults. Figure 2.7 shows the FSA model of both
isolators. The events ’Isi:0→1’ and ’Isi:1→0’ represent the transition of residual
signal from state ZERO to ONE and from state ONE to ZERO, respectively. The
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Figure 2.7: The FSA modeling the isolators: (a) Is1, (b) Is2
Step 2 - Consistency between the DES Model of System and Isolator
The abstract DES models for the system and isolators capture the interactions be-
tween them, i.e. any changes in the system such as mode changes and the occurrence
of the faults should lead to the changes in the output of isolators. The DES model
of the system is then modiﬁed to enforce this consistency requirement by adding
appropriate self-loop transitions.
Let Habs be the abstract DES model of the spacecraft example (shown in
Figure 2.8). The continuous dynamics of the system are deﬁned at each state in
terms of Eq. (2.4).
The modiﬁed DES abstraction of the spacecraft example, Hˆabs, is constructed
from Habs by adding certain self-loop transitions at each discrete state as shown in
Figure 2.9. For instance, at state q0, the self-loop transitions are ’Is1 : 0’, ’Is1:1→0’,
’Is2 : 0’ and ’Is2:1→0’. This implies that the isolators Is1 and Is2 cannot have the
transition from ZERO to ONE as this is a healthy state of the system with no
present faults. Di for i=0,. . . ,3 are the outputs of the DES model at each state.
Step 3 - Enforcing the Assumption by DES Model
As described earlier in this section, we need to introduce a new automaton enforcing
our assumption of the time between the occurrence of two consecutive events. The
21


































































































































































































Figure 2.8: Habs - The hybrid automaton model for the spacecraft example.
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Figure 2.9: Hˆabs - The modiﬁed DES abstraction for the spacecraft example.
automaton ASMIs shown in Figure 2.10 models the above assumption.
Step 4 - Constructing EDESA
The EDESA of the hybrid system and isolators, denoted as H˜ , is deﬁned as the
synchronous product of Hˆabs, the modiﬁed DES abstraction, (Is1,Is2), the automata






Is1:0→1, Is1:1→0, Is1:0, Is1:1 
Is2:0→1, Is2:1→0, Is2:0, Is2:1 
Figure 2.10: ASMIs - The FSA enforcing the assumption.
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is shown in Eq. (2.6).
H˜ = sync(Hˆabs, Is1, Is2, ASMIs) (2.6)
Figure 2.11 shows the EDESA of the spacecraft example. The output at each
state is the 3-tuple [Dx,r1,r2] where Dx was given in Figure 2.9 and r1 and r2 are
the discretized output of the isolators.
Step 5 - Building the Diagnoser
A part of the diagnoser is designed and shown in Figure 2.12 where the failure mode
F2 is detected. The discrete outputs of the EDESA are observed and based on the
EDESA model, the possible states of EDESA and consequently the health condition
of the model are estimated. We continue probing the outputs of the model until
the condition of the model is deﬁned. Overalls, the diagnoser combines discrete
information (thrusters on/oﬀ status) and continuous information (obtained from
sensors, processed to generate residuals) to arrive at a diagnoser.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, a method for hybrid fault diagnosis is described with a simple
example. This approach develops a systematic method to integrate the information
in continuous variable data, such as pressure sensor in a valve, with discrete value
data, such as threshold sensors, to achieve more accurate diagnosis.
A bank of residual generators are ﬁrst constructed to detect and isolate the
faults. They will then be abstracted by DES models and integrated with the DES
abstraction of the system to construct an extended DES model. Finally, this ex-












































































































































Figure 2.11: EDESA - EDESA Model of the spacecraft.
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 Z0 
N, F1, F2 
4, 7, 8, 13, 17, 23, 18, 24 
N, F1, F2 
7,8, 4,17,18, 0, 23, 24 
N, F1, F2 
0, 25, 29, 32 
F2 
29, 32, 25, 36 
     F2 
[D1, 0, 0] 
[D1, 0, 0] 
[D1, 0, 1] 
[D1, 0, 1] 




D1: T1 on, T2 off 
residual one=0 
residual two=0 
D1: T1 on, T2 off 
residual one=0 
residual two=1 
Figure 2.12: Part of the diagnoser constructed for the spacecraft example based on
EDESA model (Fig. 2.11)
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Chapter 3




In this chapter, we propose a decentralized implementation of the hybrid diagnosis
method described in the previous chapter. This method is applied for fault diagno-
sis in decentralized systems that are distributed geographically such as spacecraft
formations and teams of robots.
3.1 A Decentralized Hybrid Fault Diagnosis De-
sign System
The proposed method in this thesis is illustrated in Figure 3.1. In this scheme,
diagnosis is performed by local diagnosers who have access to both local continuous




continuous data discrete-event data
Local Diagnoser 1
System n
continuous data discrete-event data
Local Diagnoser n
. . .
Figure 3.1: Proposed Method Scheme - A Decentralized Hybrid Diagnosis with
Discrete Information Exchange
supervisory commands to change mode of operation). In order to reduce the amount
of communicated data, the local diagnosers only exchange the discrete data or the
discretized versions of the continuous data.
This hybrid approach is applied to a system consisting of two spacecraft in
Leader-Follower Formation to investigate faults in actuators and sensors in the
system. Speciﬁcally, we explore the design of the local diagnoser for the follower
spacecraft. The orientation of spacecraft in space can be described by continuous
state space equations. On the other hand, the dynamics of the spacecraft com-
ponents such as thrusters and accelerometer sensor can be described in terms of
discrete transitions, and then can be presented by DES models. We develop a hy-
brid automaton model representing the behavior of the system and perform a hybrid
diagnosis to detect and isolate the faults of the follower spacecraft. As discussed
previously, the only data that is to be exchanged between the spacecraft has to be
discrete-event data to limit communications. In this study, we explore the possi-
bility and limitations of decentralized fault diagnosis subject to the aforementioned
constraint on data exchange between the spacecraft.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
explain our system of a Leader-Follower spacecraft with equations and relationships
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between the components. In Section 3.3, we develop a hybrid model for our system.
Fault diagnosis based on the constructed hybrid model is explained in Section 3.4.
In Section 3.5, we investigate diﬀerent scenarios for the system and employ the
diagnoser to detect and isolate possible existing faults.
3.2 Leader-Follower Formation Flying Spacecraft
In our work, we consider the formation ﬂying spacecraft in deep space, i.e. far
from the Earth. In deep space, the gravity is small and almost the same for both
spacecraft. There its contribution to equations of motion is small. To maintain
the performance of the system, it is important to keep the orientation and relative
position of the spacecraft in a desired range.
The fundamental devices for spacecraft stabilization in the space are Actu-
ators and Sensors. Angles, velocity and acceleration are measured by sensors
to determine the position and orientation of spacecraft with respect to a reference
system. Some of the most commonly used sensors are Sun Sensor, Earth Sensor,
Star Sensor,Magnetometer, Gyroscope, Accelerometer and Laser Relative Distance.
On the other hand, actuators generate the required torque for the spacecraft to
push them around the space. Some of the well-known actuators are reaction wheel,
magnetotorquer and thrusters.
In our work, we consider a group of two spacecraft in a Leader-Follower forma-
tion as shown in Figure 3.2. We study fault diagnosis in the follower. The leader’s
components are subject to failure and are monitored by a separate local diagnosis
system. So, from the follower’s diagnosis perspective, the leader is fault-free. For
the purpose of maintaining the relative distance between the spacecraft, we have
chosen some of the mentioned actuator and sensors as listed below.












Figure 3.2: Two spacecraft in Leader-Follower formation on a line.
model, are either ‘on’ or ‘off ’. While active, they push the spacecraft to the
right or left direction at a constant speed. Four thrusters are placed in four
corners as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Leader thrusters are assumed fault-free
while follower thrusters may fail. We have considered two types of failures
for follower thrusters: thruster T1 may become stuck-on or all thrusters may
become stuck-oﬀ at the same time. We also assumed that the follower thrusters
are more powerful than the leader thrusters to enable it to track the leader’s
maneuvers.
• Distance Sensor, a laser sensor which measures the relative distance between
leader and follower spacecraft. In our problem, this sensor is in the follower and
notiﬁes the follower supervisor if the relative distance becomes low, high or
normal. We assume that the health of this sensor is monitored using hardware
redundancy and from the diagnoser’s perspective, this sensor is fault-free.
• Accelerometer, measures the acceleration of spacecraft. Accelerometer may
fail and show the value of the acceleration with a bias. Here we consider
negative bias, but positive bias can be handled similarly.
In this chapter, we consider translation motion in one axis for spacecraft. In
the next chapter we consider the case in which the spacecraft also have the rotational
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Figure 3.3: The follower and local diagnoser
motion in addition to translational motion.
The objective of this chapter is to develop a hybrid fault diagnoser for the
follower spacecraft. We assume that the leader maneuver commands constitute the
discrete data which is transmitted from the leader to the follower. The follower
supervisor observes the distance sensor output and issues the necessary commands
based on this value to maintain the required distance. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.3.
Assuming that the spacecraft are initially deployed far from each other, the
follower attempts to decrease the distance and moves towards the leader. When the
relative distance is detected to be in the desired range, a ‘stop’ command will be
issued for the follower. On the other hand, if the relative distance becomes less than
the desired value, the ‘increase distance’ command will be issued. In the meantime,
the leader may change its position.
In the presence of a failure, the system shows the same behavior which may
lead to a diﬀerent result. As an example, assume that while the follower is moving,
the thruster T1 fails, stuck-on. If the relative distance becomes low, the ‘stop’ and









Figure 3.4: The Follower spacecraft
But the follower will continue moving in the previous direction because of the stuck-
on T1. As the faults are assumed to be permanent, the system remains in the faulty
condition indeﬁnitely.
Based on what we discussed so far, let us model the dynamical behavior of the
system. Consider the follower spacecraft model in Figure 3.4. The laws of motion
for this spacecraft are
x˙ = v (3.1)
Mv˙ = F (3.2)
where x is the absolute position of follower, v is the velocity, M is the total mass of
the spacecraft and F is the net force applied to it.
In Figure 3.4, ‘ui’ refers to the applied force to the spacecraft resulting from
thruster Ti. The arrows show the direction of the force. Therefore, we have
F = u1 − u2 − u3 + u4 (3.3)
On the other hand, the gravity is negligible as the system operates in deep
space. For simplicity, we assume that the spacecraft mass is normalized to 1. Hence,
we have












Figure 3.5: Leader and Follower Formation.
3.3 System Model
We ﬁrst start by modeling individual components, controller and interaction among
the components and then use MATLAB/SIMULINK Software along with DECK
Toolbox [1] to build the ﬁnal model.
3.3.1 DES Model of System Components
Based on the discrete behavior of the system components, we can model the whole
system by discrete-event models. Our leader-follower system is shown in Figure 3.5.
Follower Thrusters
As spacecraft move to the right or left, we can consider follower thrusters (T1,T4)
or (T2,T3) as single components that push the spacecraft to right or left. These
thrusters can be either normal or faulty. Two fault types may occur in the follower
thrusters: all thrusters are stuck-oﬀ or only T1 is stuck-on. We have assumed single
failure scenario for the system, i.e., no two faults happen at the same time.
The automaton modeling follower thrusters is shown in Figure 3.6. There are
seven states and ﬁve events ‘T1, T4−on’, ‘T2, T3−on’, ‘off ’, ‘all−fail’ and ‘T1−fail’
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Figure 3.6: FT - Follower Thrusters
representing the commands on, off and failures all stuck− off and T1 stuck− on.
For simplicity, fault events are shown by dashed-lines. Event ‘all − fail’ enters the
system in the mode that all thrusters are stuck-oﬀ at the same time. On the other
hand, event ‘T1 − fail’ means that thruster T1 has become stuck-on. We assume,
for simplicity, that all stuck− off failure may happen when thrusters are either on
or oﬀ while T1 stuck − on can only happen when the pair (T1,T4) is on.
We assume that in our system leader components are fault-free. The automa-
ton modeling the leader thrusters is shown in Figure 3.7.
Relative Distance Laser Sensor
This laser sensor measures the relative distance between the leader and follower. In
our model, the distance is divided into three discrete levels: high, normal and low.
The automaton in Figure 3.8 models the changes in the output of the sensor. Each
event represents a transition in the sensor output from one discrete level to another.
For example, event ‘r : H2N ’ is generated when the sensor output changes from
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Figure 3.8: RDS - Relative Distance Sensor
High to Low. We assume that the measured distance is reliable and the sensor is
fault-free.
The relative acceleration between leader and follower is calculated by taking
the second derivative of relative distance and is used for fault diagnosis. This will be
further discussed in section 3.4.1. The relative acceleration can be zero, positive or
negative. The discrete event model for acceleration is shown in Figure 3.9. Similar
to the relative distance, event ‘r¨ : +20’ is generated when the acceleration changes









Figure 3.9: RA - Relative Acceleration
Accelerometer
There is an accelerometer in the follower spacecraft that measures its acceleration.
For fault diagnosis purpose, the acceleration is divided into 5 levels: negative, very
negative, positive, very positive and zero. It shows positive when the spacecraft
is moving to the right direction but only thruster T1 is ﬁring. On the other hand,
very positive acceleration happens when both thrusters T1 and T3 are active and
push the spacecraft to the right direction.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the automaton model for the follower accelerometer.
There are eight events ‘acc : P2Z’, ‘acc : Z2P ’, ‘acc : P2PP ’, ‘acc : PP2P ’, ‘acc :
N2Z’, ‘acc : Z2N ’, ‘acc : N2NN ’ and ‘acc : NN2N ’ representing the transition
of accelerometer output between ﬁve levels. For example, event ‘acc : Z2P ’ is
generated when the accelerometer output changes from zero to positive and so
on. The accelerometer may encounter loss of eﬀectiveness as deﬁned by the event
‘acc− fail’. It means that there may be a bias in the measured values. We assume
that the accelerometer shows a value less than the actual value. For example, it
may show positive instead of very positive.
Single-Failure Scenarios
In this thesis, the system is examined in a single-failure mode, i.e. only one fault at
a time could happen. We assume that faults are permanent. This means that if the
36
 acc: Z2P acc: P2Z 
acc-fail acc-fail acc-fail acc-fail 
Very Positive Very Negative 
Positive 
Negative 





























acc: Z2N acc: N2NN 
acc: N2NN 
acc: NN2N 











Figure 3.11: FSCN - Single Failure Scenarios
system enters a failure mode, it stays in that failure mode forever. This assumption
can be included in the model using the discrete event model in Figure 3.11.
3.3.2 Interactions Among the Components
Due to the interactions among the components, changes in status of one may aﬀect
other’s behaviors. The interactions considered in our system are:
• Interactions among follower thrusters and accelerometer,
• Interactions among leader thrusters, follower thrusters and their relative ac-
celeration.
Interactions among follower thrusters and accelerometer
As discussed in the previous section, the acceleration measured by accelerometer
depends on the number of active thrusters and their health status. The interaction
model is obtained by ﬁrst forming the synchronous product of the DES model of
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accelerometer, follower thrusters and fault scenarios
INTFACC = sync(FT,ACC, FSCN) (3.5)
where FT is the model of follower thrusters, ACC is the model of accelerometer
and FSCN is the single failure scenario model.
Next, selﬂoops are added to the interaction model as shown in Figure 3.12. For
example, in the state (2, H), the thruster pair (T1, T4) is active and the accelerometer
is healthy. In this case, the measured acceleration is very positive. The selﬂoops
represent the events in which the accelerometer output changes to very positive or
PP .
Interactions among follower thrusters, leader thrusters and relative ac-
celeration
The relative acceleration is calculated by taking the second derivative of relative
distance between leader and follower and is a function of thruster pairs (T1, T4), (T2,
T3), (T1 ,´ T4 )´ and (T2 ,´ T3 )´ and their health status. The relative acceleration can be
zero, positive or negative depending on the leader and follower moving direction with
respect to each other. We deﬁne this value as the acceleration of follower with respect
to the acceleration of the leader. For example, if the leader is accelerating to the
right direction while the follower is accelerating to the left, the relative acceleration
will be negative. The relative acceleration with respect to the state of leader and
follower thrusters is shown in Table 3.1. For example, in state (2,1), where the
leader thruster pair (T1 ,´ T4 )´ is on and all the thrusters in the follower are oﬀ, the




















































Figure 3.12: Selﬂoops for Interactions among Follower Thrusters and Accelerometer
40
Table 3.1: The Relative Acceleration with respect to the Follower and Leader
Thrusters
State Number (L,F) Leader State Follower State Relative Acceleration
(1,1) All Thrusters Oﬀ All Thrusters Oﬀ 0
(1,2) All Thrusters Oﬀ (T1, T4) On +
(1,3) All Thrusters Oﬀ (T2, T3) On -
(1,4) All Thrusters Oﬀ All Thrusters Fail 0
(1,5) All Thrusters Oﬀ T1 - fail and (T1, T4) On +
(1,6) All Thrusters Oﬀ T1 - fail and other Thrusters Oﬀ +
(1,7) All Thrusters Oﬀ T1 - fail and (T2, T3) On -
(2,1) (T´1, T´4) On All Thrusters Oﬀ -
(2,2) (T´1, T´4) On (T1, T4) On +
(2,3) (T´1, T´4) On (T2, T3) On -
(2,4) (T´1, T´4) On All Thrusters Fail -
(2,5) (T´1, T´4) On T1 - fail and (T1, T4) On +
(2,6) (T´1, T´4) On T1 - fail and other Thrusters Oﬀ -
(2,7) (T´1, T´4) On T1 - fail and (T2, T3) On -
(3,1) (T´2, T´3) On All Thrusters Oﬀ +
(3,2) (T´2, T´3) On (T1, T4) On +
(3,3) (T´2, T´3) On (T2, T3) On -
(3,4) (T´2, T´3) On All Thrusters Fail +
(3,5) (T´2, T´3) On T1 - fail and (T1, T4) On +
(3,6) (T´2, T´3) On T1 - fail and other Thrusters Oﬀ +
(3,7) (T´2, T´3) On T1 - fail and (T2, T3) On +
3.3.3 Follower Supervisory Controller
The relative distance between leader and follower should remain in a certain range.
The supervisory controller generates a sequence of events for the system in or-
der to maintain this distance. For example, it commands the follower to increase
its distance from the leader when the relative distance becomes low. The con-
troller events for maintaining this distance are shown in Figure 3.13. The events
‘decrease distance’ and ‘increase distance’ are generated whenever the relative dis-
tance sensor output changes from normal to high and normal to low, respectively.
Suppose the relative distance becomes low. The supervisory controller commands
the follower to increase the distance. The method of ﬁring the thrusters is bang-
bang . It means that to increase the distance, the sequence of generated events
are:
1. Turn on the thrusters T1 and T4










Figure 3.13: FollowerCommands - Follower Commands
3. Turn oﬀ the thrusters
4. wait for time τ
5. Turn on the thrusters T2 and T3
6. wait for time τ
7. Turn oﬀ the thrusters
where 2τ is the length of thruster ﬁring. Suppose that δ>0 is the desired accuracy
in adjusting the relative distance, τ is then chosen so that the distance traveled
through the above sequence is less than δ. The automata enforcing these sequences
is presented in Figure 3.14.
The automaton modeling the sequence controller is obtained by integrating the
automata of Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 using the synchronous product operator.
Let FollowerCommands and FollowerSequences denote the automata modeling
the controller events of Figure 3.13 and controlling sequences of Figure 3.14, respec-
tively. The FollowerControllerDES can be obtained as
FollowerControllerDES = sync(FollowerCommands, FollowerSequences)
(3.6)
As depicted in Figure 3.14, there is an event ‘pulse’ between each ‘on’ and
‘off ’ command. This represents the duration in which the thruster pairs (T1,T4) or
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Figure 3.14: FollowerSequences - Follower Sequences
(T2,T3) are on.
3.3.4 Hybrid Modeling
The DES abstraction of the follower can be formed using the synchronous product of
the automata modeling the components, the automata modeling their interactions
and the sequence controller automata. Let the automaton
SystemDESabs = (Qabs,Σabs, Tabs, Dabs, λabs, qabs,0) (3.7)
be the DES abstraction of the leader-follower system. We have
SystemDESabs = sync(ComponentDES, InteractionsDES, SequenceController, FSCN)
(3.8)
where
ComponentDES = sync(FT1T4, FT2T3, LT,RDS,RA,ACC) (3.9)
and
InteractionsDES = sync(INTFACC, INTLFA) (3.10)
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The hybrid automaton of the system can be written as
System = (Q,X,U, FT, Y, Init, S,Σ, T,D, λ, q0) (3.11)
where








The system has a total of 6 components. Therefore, each discrete state of the
system can be describes as a 6-tuple q=(q1,...,q6), where qi represents the state of
each component. The hybrid automaton model of the system has 5074 discrete
states and 33306 transition
The faults in the system can be modeled by additive fault signals. We can




X˙(t) = AqX(t) + BqU(t) + LqF (t)








⎦ , Bq = Lq (3.14)
In the above equation, U(t), F (t) and Lq represent the matrices of applied forces to
the follower, follower failures and the vector of the fault signatures in the discrete
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state q, respectively. Also, x(t) is the position of the follower and x˙(t) is the follower
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Note that the accelerometer bias failure is not included in these equations. We can
simply show the accelerometer failure by adding the bias value to the output of the
accelerometer.
In equation (3.15), the output y(t) is the velocity of the follower while the input
U(t) is the applied force to it from the thrusters in which ui(t) = 1.2 if thruster Ti
is on and ui(t) = 0 if thruster Ti is off . The values in matrix F (t) are chosen based
on the follower failure mode. For example, if the system enters the failure mode in
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In this equation, f1(t) = 1.2 is the applied force to the follower from thruster T1
which is stuck-on.
3.4 Fault Diagnoser
In this section, we design the residual generators (or isolators) for the system. Then,
the hybrid fault diagnoser for the system will be constructed.
3.4.1 Residual Generator Design
There are three approaches for residual generators: parity space, observer-based
and parameter estimation. In this work we apply the parity space approach. This
approach is based on the ‘parity check ’, i.e. testing the parity equations that are
based on the system equations and measured signals. If there is any inconsistency
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in these parity equations, the occurrence of a failure can be estimated.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the acceleration of the follower is measured by the
accelerometer. We also calculate the Expected Acceleration from equation (3.4).
The parity check is then applied by comparing the measured and expected accel-
erations. If there is an inconsistency between these two values, we can say that a
failure has happened. The parity residual signal, PD, can be written as
PD = Expected Acceleration−Measured Acceleration (3.18)
PD is then used for Fault Detection ; as PD = 0 if the system is in normal mode
of operation and PD 	= 0 if the system is in faulty mode of operation.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, there are three fault types in the system: ac-
celerometer bias failure, thruster T1 stuck-on and all follower thrusters stuck-oﬀ. A
proper fault diagnosis includes Fault Isolation as well as fault detection. There-
fore, after detecting the presence of a failure, we have to distinguish the active fault.
Note that single failure scenario is assumed.
Fault isolation is performed by observing the parity signal PI . The parity equa-
tion compares the Expected Relative Acceleration with the Actual Relative
Acceleration .
PI = sgn(Expected Relative Acceleration)− sgn(Actual Relative Acceleration)
(3.19)
where sgn(.) is the Sign Function. The actual relative acceleration is calculated by
taking the second derivative of the relative distance sensor output as




In Equation (4.11), sgn(Actual Relative Acceleration) is calculated by probing the
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sign of the actual relative acceleration using Equation (3.21) below.
sgn(Actual Relative Acceleration) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−1 ifActual Relative Acceleration < 0,
0 ifActual Relative Acceleration = 0,
1 ifActual Relative Acceleration > 0.
(3.21)
The sign of expected relative acceleration is listed in Table 3.1 with respect to the
status of leader and follower thrusters. If this sign is consistent with the sign of actual
relative acceleration in Equation (3.21), we can say that this is the accelerometer
that shows the wrong acceleration and therefore it is faulty. On the other hand, if
there is an inconsistency between these values the failure is from thrusters.
Finally, isolation between thruster faults is done by probing the accelerometer
sensor output. If all thrusters are stuck-oﬀ, the accelerometer will not pick any
acceleration. The above comparison process (including PD, PI) is performed by the
hybrid diagnoser. In the next section, we will discuss more about the fault detection
and isolation procedure in the follower.
3.5 Simulation Results
We use the MATLAB/SIMULINK software to simulate the system behavior.
Discrete Event Control Kit (DECK) software is also used for constructing
the DES model of the system. DECK is a toolbox written in the programming
language of MATLAB for the analysis and design of supervisory control systems
based on discrete-event models [1]. In this section, we assume diﬀerent maneuvers
for the leader spacecraft and analyze the response of the follower in both normal
and faulty modes of operation.
Figure 3.15 shows the position of leader and follower spacecraft in normal and
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faulty modes of operation in normalized time units. The solid line shows the leader
position on the x-axis at each time with the origin being its initial position and the
dashed line represents the follower position. The decrease in this values mean that
the spacecraft is accelerating to left, while an increase means it is accelerating to
the right direction. We set the desired relative distance between the spacecraft to
be 12 distance units.
In Figure 3.15(a), at the beginning, the spacecraft are deployed 20 units apart
from each other which is ‘high’. That makes the follower decrease its distance with
the leader and accelerates to the left direction till the distance falls in the ‘normal’
range. A similar scenario will happen if the relative distance becomes less that 10
units or ‘low’. Figure 3.15(b) shows the same maneuver for the leader except that
at the time around t = 65 all the follower thrusters become ‘stuck − off ’. This
makes the follower continue moving in the same direction at a constant speed.
In the next section, diﬀerent maneuvers are deﬁned for the leader and the
reaction of the follower and the values of fault detection and isolation signals will
be explained in both normal and faulty conditions.
3.5.1 Normal Mode of Operation
In this scenario, the system operates in a fault-free mode. The follower follows the
leader maneuver while keeping the relative distance at a desirable range; 12 units.
Figure 3.16 demonstrates the spacecraft maneuver in normal mode of operation
when the initial relative distance is ‘high’.
Figure 3.16 shows the position of the leader and follower spacecraft on a line
with the origin being the initial position of the leader, fault detection signal PD
and fault isolation signal PI , respectively. We mentioned in Section 3.4 that the PD
signal is used for detecting the presence of the faults. We also assumed that the




Figure 3.15: Position of Leader and Follower spacecraft in: (a) Normal Mode of
Operation, (b) Faulty Mode of Operation
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Figure 3.16: Normal Operation Mode
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means that when follower receives the command to move towards the right, it ﬁrst
accelerates to the right and then to the left. The same can be said for going to the
left direction; ﬁrst it accelerates to the left and after that to the right. This makes
the accelerometer pick up both positive and negative accelerations while moving in
a single direction. It is observed that the accelerometer output signal has several
sudden variations, as depicted in Figure 3.17.
The reader may note that if the ‘decrease − distance’ command is activated
during the bang-bang ﬁrings, the follower will not decrease its distance till the end
of bang-bang ﬁrings. This may cause some delays in the response of the follower as
shown in Figure 3.16.
The parity signal PD in Eq. (3.18) is the diﬀerence between the expected
and measured accelerations. The expected acceleration is the total force applied
to the follower as deﬁned in Eq. (3.4) and can be 0, ±1.2 or ±2.4. The measured
acceleration is , however, the output of accelerometer and is shown in Figure 3.17.
From Eq. (3.18) and this ﬁgure, we expect the parity signal PD to have similar
sudden variations. Because of these ﬂuctuations, it is reasonable to use the mean
value of the signal for fault diagnosis. The same is true for PI signal in fault isolation.
The mean of PD and PI signals are shown in Figure 3.16. Based on these plots, one
can say that the system evolves in the normal mode and no failure has happened.
3.5.2 Faulty Mode of Operation
In this section we assume diﬀerent failures for the follower and observe its behavior.
The leader is assumed to be fault-free.
Accelerometer Bias Failure
At time t = 3×104 the accelerometer fails and develops a bias of ’+2’ in its readings,




Figure 3.17: Follower Accelerometer Output for: (a) 0 ≤ t ≤ 5000, (b) 0 ≤ t ≤ 35000
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Figure 3.18: System Performance with Accelerometer’s Positive Bias Failure
in Figure 3.18. As one can see from this ﬁgure, the follower continues its maneuver
correctly even after the occurrence of failure. We can say that the accelerometer
failure does no aﬀect the maneuver of the follower. This was expected, because
controlling the maneuver of the follower is only based on the relative distance.
On the other hand, the parity signal PD decreases after accelerometer fails.
As the signal is no longer zero, we can say that a failure has happened. Now that
we have detected the occurrence of a failure, we have to isolate it, i.e. see whether
it is from thrusters or accelerometer. We observe that the parity signal PI , depicted
in Figure 3.18, is approximately zero. Therefore, the failure is from accelerometer.
Figure 3.19 shows the spacecraft maneuvers and fault diagnosis signals for a
’−2’ bias in the accelerometer output.
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Figure 3.19: System Performance with Accelerometer’s Negative Bias Failure
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Figure 3.20: System Performance with Thruster T1 becomes stuck-on
Thruster T1 stuck-on
In this part, we consider the failure of thruster T1. The spacecraft maneuver and
parity signals are shown in Figure 3.20. At time t = 22 × 103 thruster T1 fails and
follower continues moving right at a rapidly increasing pace. Note that the parity
signals PD and PI become nonzero after failure happens.
All Thrusters stuck-oﬀ
Figure 3.21 illustrates the system performance when all thrusters become stuck-oﬀ
before starting the operation. This may happen because of a common failure in the
actuation system of the spacecraft.
As mentioned in section 3.3.1, thrusters may become stuck-oﬀ when they are
either on or off . Therefore, the follower may stop or continue moving based on
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Figure 3.21: System Performance with all Thrusters become stuck-oﬀ
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Figure 3.22: System Performance with all Thrusters become stuck-oﬀ
the last received command. In Figure 3.22, the failure happens when the follower
was moving to the left direction. As we can see, it continues going left even when
the relative distance becomes low. Moreover, Figure 3.23 demonstrates the system
behavior in which the follower was going right before the failure happens.
Note that the parity signals, PD and PI , are both non-zero when the failure
is active. This is similar to the case where only thruster T1 was stuck-on. To
diﬀerentiate these two faults, one may refer to the mean of the accelerometer output
signal as shown in Figure 3.24.
Discarding the initial ﬂuctuations due to the transients in sensor measurements
in Figure 3.24(a), we can see that the mean of measured acceleration in the presence
of thruster T1 failure is nonzero. This signal is almost zero when all thrusters become
stuck-oﬀ, as shown in Figure 3.24(b).
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Remark 1 - The impact of discretization
In this chapter, the output of the relative distance and accelerometer sensors are
discretized into 3 and 5 levels, respectively. These levels of discretization do not
have any impacts on the accuracy of the diagnosis in this particular system. The
reason is that we have used parity signals PD and PI for fault diagnosis and neither
signal is aﬀected by the discretizations.
Remark 2 - Spacecraft mass
In Eq. (3.2) we assumed that the mass of the spacecraft is constant and we normal-
ized its value to 1. In the case of variable mass, the construction of parity signals
would not change. Therefore, the diagnoser will perform similarly in this system.
However, the simulations will be diﬀerent from the constant mass as the continuous
dynamics of the system are changed.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated fault diagnosis in a system of Leader/Follower space-
craft in deep space. We described the system components and reviewed the dynam-
ics of the system. We introduced diﬀerent modes of operations and developed the
state-space equations for one of the operating modes. Moreover, we developed a
DES model of the system. Parity signals were also formulated from sensor output
signal. Subsequently, the fault diagnoser was built based on the system model and
parity signals. We considered three fault scenarios for the system and investigated
the performance of diagnoser for each mode of operation. We also discussed how to
isolate the faults by applying parity signals.
In this work, we studied failure diagnosability using simulation. A formal
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test for failure diagnosability for hybrid diagnoser has been presented in [1]. The
implementation of this test in the form of a software code would provide a more
comprehensive assessment of our approach. This implementation is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
In the next chapter, however, we will extend the problem presented in Chap-
ter 3 to the case involving spacecraft rotation.
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Chapter 4
Hybrid Fault Diagnosis in
Leader-Follower with
One-Dimensional Translational
Motion and Rotation Around a
Fixed Axis
In this chapter, we apply our hybrid fault diagnosis approach to a leader-follower
pair spacecraft similar to the one in the previous chapter. In this case, the spacecraft
rotate as well around an axis perpendicular to the translation axis. There are three
possible faulty components in the follower; Actuators, Accelerometer and Gyroscope.
Similar to the previous chapter, we describe the dynamics of the components by DES
models. We will then develop a hybrid automaton model representing the behavior















Figure 4.1: Leader-Follower Spacecraft
The rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we explain the mathe-
matical equations of spacecraft and the relationship between the components. In
Section 4.2, a hybrid model for our system is developed. Fault diagnosis based on the
constructed hybrid model is then explained in Section 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4, we
study diﬀerent scenarios for the system and use the diagnoser to detect and isolate
possible faults.
4.1 Leader-Follower Formation Flying Spacecraft
In this chapter, we consider a group of two spacecraft in a Leader-Follower forma-
tion ﬂying in deep space. In this problem, the spacecraft move along a ﬁxed axis
while rotating around an axis perpendicular to the translation axis as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. In this formation ﬂying, we would like to keep their relative distance
at a desired range and their angular orientation similar to each other. Each space-
craft has four Thrusters, one Distance Sensor, one Accelerometer and also
one Gyroscope. Similar to the previous model, we assume that all the elements in
the leader are fault free. In the follower, however, elements may fail according to
the list below. Note that the faults are considered to be permanent.
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• Thrusters, thruster ‘T1’ may become stuck-on or all thrusters may become
stuck-oﬀ at the same time.
• Accelerometer, measuring the acceleration with a positive or negative bias.
• Gyroscope, measures the angular velocity of the spacecraft and it may fail
and its data become unavailable.
• Distance Sensor, this sensor may fail. However, we assume that the health of
this sensor is monitored using hardware redundancy and from the diagnoser’s
perspective, this sensor is fault-free.
The gyroscope measures the angular velocity. Using this angular velocity, we
calculate angular acceleration and also angular position denoted by θ in Figure 4.1.
The follower supervisor observes the distance sensor output and the angular position
and issues the necessary commands based on these values to maintain the required
distance and angular position. A general procedure in the system is as follows.
Assuming that the spacecraft are initially deployed far from each other, the
follower receives the command to decrease the distance and moves towards the
leader. Before decreasing the distance, the follower should rotate to the vertical
position (θ=0). If the gyroscope shows a nonzero value, a ‘turn clockwise’ or ‘turn
counterclockwise’ command will be issued for the follower. It rotates by ﬁring the
opposite side thrusters until θ becomes zero. Then, based on the relative distance
between the spacecraft, the appropriate commands will be issued as discussed in
the previous chapter. Finally, follower rotates so that its angular position becomes
similar to the follower’s. Note that in the meantime, the leader may change its
position.
The dynamics of the system is similar to the previous chapter. The laws of
motion, however, should be modiﬁed to incorporate the angular rotation as shown
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in the following equations.
x˙ = v (4.1)
Mv˙ = F · cos (θ) (4.2)
where x is the absolute position of the follower, v is the velocity, M is the mass
of the spacecraft and F is the net force applied to it. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the spacecraft mass equals 1. The gravity is also negligible as the
system operates in deep space. Hence, we have
x¨ = F · cos (θ) = (u1 − u2 − u3 + u4) · cos (θ) (4.3)
where ‘ui’ refers to the applied force to the spacecraft resulting from thruster ‘Ti’ as
shown in Figure 4.2. For rotation we have
ω = θ˙ (4.4)
Iω˙ = (−F1 + F2 − F3 + F4) · a
2
(4.5)






We begin this section by modeling individual components, controller and interactions
among the components. We will then use MATLAB/SIMULINK Software along










Figure 4.2: The Follower Spacecraft
4.2.1 DES Model of System Components
As discussed before, the considered leader-follower formation has discrete charac-
teristics. We use discrete-event models to show the discrete behavior of the system.
The DES model of the system components are described in the following.
Follower Thrusters
The follower has two types of movement, translation in one axis and rotation around
its center of gravity. To model the thrusters, we group them based on the movement
of the spacecraft as follows.
• Translation, (T1,T4) for accelerating to the right direction and (T2,T3) for
accelerating to the left direction.
• Rotation, (T1,T3) for rotating clockwise (cw) and (T2,T4) for rotating coun-
terclockwise (ccw).
Figure 4.3 illustrates the DES model of these thrusters. The conﬁguration of the
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Figure 4.3: FT - Follower Thrusters
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Figure 4.4: LT - Leader Thrusters
The fault-free DES model of leader thrusters is also pictured in Figure 4.4.
Relative Distance Sensor
Similar to the previous chapter, a laser sensor measures the relative distance between
the leader and follower and is assumed to be fault-free. The output of this sensor is
divided into three discrete levels, high, normal and low. A DES model representing
this sensor is shown in Figure 4.5. Taking the second derivative of this sensor’s
output, we calculate the actual relative acceleration and build a DES model for



















Figure 4.6: RA - Relative Acceleration
Accelerometer
The accelerometer measures the acceleration of the follower spacecraft. It may fail
and have a bias in its output, e.g. showing a smaller acceleration than the actual
value. Similar to the previous chapter, this value is divided into ﬁve discrete levels:
negative, very negative, positive, very positive and zero. As an example, it
shows positive when the spacecraft is moving to the right direction but only thruster
T1 is ﬁring. In the case of rotation, ﬁring of pairs (T1,T3) and (T2,T4), accelerometer
shows a zero acceleration. Therefore, the DES model of accelerometer is similar to
the model of the previous chapter as shown in Figure 4.7. Note that the fault in the
accelerometer means that there is a negative bias in the measured value, showing a
smaller acceleration than the actual value. For example, it may show zero instead
of positive.
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Figure 4.7: ACC - Accelerometer
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Figure 4.8: ANGACC - Discretized Angular Acceleration
Gyroscope
The gyroscope measures the angular velocity in rotation. We use this value and
calculate the angular acceleration and angular position by taking the derivate
and integral of angular velocity.
The angular acceleration value is discretized into ﬁve discrete levels: negative,
very negative, positive, very positive and zero. For example, it shows positive
when the spacecraft is rotating counterclockwise and thruster T1 is stuck-on. If T1
is normal, the gyroscope shows very negative when (T1,T3) ﬁres. Figure 4.8 shows
the DES model for this discretized value. We assume that the gyroscope may fail
and its data becomes unavailable.
The angular position is the angle between y-axis and the body axis of the
spacecraft which is perpendicular to the thrusters as shown in Figure 4.2. This




Figure 4.9: Discrete Levels of Angular Position with 0 : −δ ≤ θ < δ (a) P1 : δ ≤
θ < 90, (b) P2 : 90 ≤ θ < 180,(c) P3 : 180 ≤ θ < 270, (d) P4 : 270 ≤ θ < 360− δ
Figure 4.9 where δ is a small positive number. The spacecraft is in vertical position
when the output is zero.
The discrete event model for the angular position is depicted in Figure 4.10.
We can see that the discrete values become unavailable when the gyroscope fails.
There are ﬁve events ‘θ : 0’, ‘θ : P1’, ‘θ : P2’, ‘θ : P3’ and ‘θ : P4’ representing
changes in the angular position. The event ’gy − fail’ occurs when the gyroscope
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gy-fail
Figure 4.10: TETA - Angular Position
Fault Scenario
Single failure scenario with permanent faults is assumed, i.e. only one fault at a
time is present and that the faults are permanent. This assumption is enforced by
the DES model in Figure 4.11.
4.2.2 Interactions Among the Components
We expect from our system that the change in the status of one of the components
aﬀect the other components’ behavior due to the interactions among them. These
interactions can be modeled using discrete event models and are:
• Accelerometer reading as a function of follower thruster and angular position.
• Angular acceleration as a function of follower thrusters.














Figure 4.11: FSCN - Single Failure Scenario
Accelerometer reading as a function of follower thruster and angular po-
sition
In this part we model the relationship between the follower thrusters and the accel-
eration. The output of the accelerometer at each state depends upon the angular
position of the follower. For example, when the thrusters pair (T1, T4) is active
and the spacecraft is moving to the right direction, the accelerometer will show
‘very positive’ if θ ∈ P1 while it will show ‘very negative’ if θ ∈ P2.
The output of accelerometer in both healthy and faulty conditions is shown
in Table 4.1 with respect to the follower thrusters and angular position. Note that
thrusters and accelerometer failures are not active at the same time due to the
single-failure scenario.
Angular acceleration as a function of follower thrusters
The gyroscope output depends on the number of active thrusters and their health
status. We will explain in Section 4.3 that for fault diagnosis the value of angular
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Table 4.1: Interactions among Follower Thrusters and Accelerometer




P1 or P1´ Zero Negative
P2 or P2´ Zero Negative
P3 or P3´ Zero Negative
P4 or P4´ Zero Negative
2
P1 or P1´ Very Positive Positive
P2 or P2´ Very Negative Very Negative
P3 or P3´ Very Negative Very Negative
P4 or P4´ Very Positive Positive
3
P1 or P1´ Zero Negative
P2 or P2´ Zero Negative
P3 or P3´ Zero Negative
P4 or P4´ Zero Negative
4
P1 or P1´ Very Negative Very Negative
P2 or P2´ Very Positive Positive
P3 or P3´ Very Positive Positive
P4 or P4´ Very Negative Very Negative
5
P1 or P1´ Zero Negative
P2 or P2´ Zero Negative
P3 or P3´ Zero Negative
P4 or P4´ Zero Negative
6
P1 or P1´ Very Positive ——
P2 or P2´ Very Negative ——
P3 or P3´ Very Negative ——
P4 or P4´ Very Positive ——
7
P1 or P1´ Zero ——
P2 or P2´ Zero ——
P3 or P3´ Zero ——
P4 or P4´ Zero ——
8
P1 or P1´ Positive ——
P2 or P2´ Negative ——
P3 or P3´ Negative ——
P4 or P4´ Positive ——
9
P1 or P1´ Negative ——
P2 or P2´ Positive ——
P3 or P3´ Positive ——
P4 or P4´ Negative ——
10
P1 or P1´ Positive ——
P2 or P2´ Negative ——
P3 or P3´ Negative ——
P4 or P4´ Positive ——
11
P1 or P1´ Zero ——
P2 or P2´ Zero ——
P3 or P3´ Zero ——
P4 or P4´ Zero ——
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Table 4.2: Mapping in Normal Condition
(Leader Angular Position, Follower Angular Position) Relative Acceleration
(P1,P1) zero, negative, positive
(P3,P1) negative
(P1,P4) positive
acceleration is required. Therefore, in this part we model the interactions between
the follower thrusters and the angular acceleration which is the derivative of the
gyroscope output. This interaction model is illustrated in Figure 4.12. Deriving the
model is similar to the previous chapter and will not be discussed here.
Relative acceleration as a function of leader thrusters, follower thrusters
and their angular positions
Next, we discuss the interactions among leader/follower spacecraft, their relative
acceleration calculated using the relative distance sensor output and angular position
calculated from the gyroscope output.
Each state of this model has three outputs: angular position of leader, angular
position of follower and the relative acceleration. The relative acceleration at each
state is a function of angular position at that state as shown in equation 4.7 below.






For simplicity, we build a mapping from angular positions to the relative acceleration
to show this relationship. Table 4.2 list some of the values from this mapping for a
normal condition when both spacecraft are ﬁring (T1, T4) and (T1 ,´ T4 )´ thrusters.
Table 4.3 shows these values in the faulty condition when thruster T1 of follower is
stuck-on and the leader is ﬁring (T2, T3).
Note that r¨ can have diﬀerent values at each state in these tables because the





































































Figure 4.12: INTFGY : Interactions among Follower Thrusters and Angular Ac-
celeration
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Table 4.3: Mapping in Faulty Condition




more precision, one can divide the angular position into more discrete levels. How-
ever, this leads to a more complex model and requires more information exchange
between the components and this is not desirable.
4.2.3 Supervisory Control
The supervisory controller generates sequence of commands for the follower in order
to maintain its relative distance and angular position. The sequence involves three
main steps:
1. The follower should rotate so that it goes to the vertical position, i.e. θ ∼= 0.
2. The relative distance is maintained by ﬁring appropriate thrusters.
3. Based on the leader’s angular position, Pi, the appropriate rotation command
is sent to the follower. The follower rotates until its angular position becomes
similar to the leader’s angular position.
The FSAs for these three steps are shown in Figure 4.13.
The sequence of commands are similar to the previous chapter and are shown
in Figure 4.14. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the event ‘pulse’ represents the
duration in which the thruster pairs are on. Calculating the synchronous product
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The DES of this system can be modeled using the synchronous product of the
automata modeling the components (Section 4.2.1), their interactions (Section 4.2.2)
and the sequence controller (Section 4.2.3).
The hybrid model of the system is similar to the hybrid model in the previous
chapter for a formation ﬂying without rotation. We can then write the dynamics of
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The residual generators for the system are designed in this section. We will then
construct the hybrid fault diagnoser for the system. For the purpose of fault diagno-
sis, the follower diagnoser receives information about the leader thruster commands
and discretized values of leader’s angular position.
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4.3.1 Residual Generator Design
The method of designing the residual generators are similar to the previous chapter
and we will not discuss it here. For Fault Detection, the parity signal PD is
generated as expressed in Equation 4.10. PD = 0 if the system is in normal mode
of operation and PD 	= 0 if the system is in faulty mode of operation.
PD = ExpectedAcceleration−MeasuredAcceleration (4.10)
For Fault Isolation, PI is generated based on the following equation.
PI = sgn(Expected Relative Acceleration)− sgn(Actual Relative Acceleration)
(4.11)
where sgn(.) is the Sign Function. The actual relative acceleration is calculated by
taking the second derivative of the relative distance sensor output as




If the parity signal PI = 0, we conclude that the accelerometer is faulty and
shows a wrong value for acceleration. On the other hand, if the parity signal is
nonzero, the failure is from the thrusters. Finally, probing the accelerometer sensor
output will give us the exact fault in the system. If all thrusters are stuck-oﬀ, the
accelerometer will not pick any acceleration. Note that if the gyroscope fails, its
data will become unavailable. It means that we can no longer calculate the angular
position of the spacecraft.
In the next section, we will discuss more about the fault detection and isolation
procedure in the system.
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4.4 Simulation Results
We simulate our system using MATLAB/SIMULINK software and use DECK Tool-
box [1] for constructing the DES model of the system. In the following, we assume
diﬀerent maneuvers for the system and analyze the response of the follower in both
normal and faulty modes of operation.
4.4.1 Normal Mode of Operation
In this scenario, there is no fault in the system and all the components are func-
tioning well. The follower follows the leader maneuver while keeping its relative
distance and angular position in a desired range as shown in Figure 4.15. In this
scenario, the leader rotates counterclockwise around 20 degrees at time t = 0.8×104
and changes its rotation to clockwise at time t = 1.2×104. It rotates till the time
t = 2.6×104 where it stops rotating and starts moving to the right direction. As we
can see, the follower follows the leader maneuver very well. The ﬁrst signal, shows
the positions of both spacecraft with respect to their initial positions. The second
graph depicts their angular positions. Parity signals are shown in the third and the
last ﬁgures and we can see that they are both zero, as we expected.
4.4.2 Faulty Mode of Operation
Now, we examine diﬀerent failure scenarios for the system and observe its behavior.
Accelerometer Bias
Figure 4.16 shows the parity signals for accelerometer failure. In Figure 4.16(a)
the failure happenes while the follower spacecraft is rotating. In Figure 4.16(b)
the failure happens after the follower rotation while translating. We can see that
the behavior of the system, the maneuver and angle, is not aﬀected by this failure.
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Figure 4.15: Normal Operation Mode
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However, the PD parity signal becomes nonzero and this shows the fault in the
accelerometer.
Thruster T1 Stuck-on
Figure 4.17 shows the parity signals for thruster T1 failure. In Figure 4.17(a) the
failure happenes while the follower spacecraft is rotating. In Figure 4.17(b) the
failure happens after the follower rotation, while changing position. We can see
that the behavior of the system is aﬀected by this failure. Also, both parity signals
becomes nonzero and this shows the fault in the thrusters.
All Thrusters Stuck-oﬀ
Similarly, Figure 4.18 shows the parity signals for all thrusters failure. In Fig-
ure 4.18(a) the failure happenes while the follower spacecraft is rotating while In
Figure 4.18(b) the failure happens after the follower rotation, while changing posi-
tion. We can see this fault aﬀects the behavior of the system and also made both
parity signals nonzero, as we expected.
Gyroscope Failure
Figure 4.19 shows the system behavior for gyroscope failure. We can see that al-
though the maneuver and the parity signals did not change, the angle data becomes
unavailable.
4.4.3 Remarks
Remark 1 - The impact of discretization
In this chapter, we have discretized the output of the relative distance sensor, ac-
celerometer and spacecraft angular position into diﬀerent discrete levels. Changing














Figure 4.18: All Thrusters Failure: (a) Failure while Rotating, (b) Failure While
Moving
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Figure 4.19: Gyroscope Failure
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in this system. For example, there is a delay in the change of parity signals in Fig-
ure 4.17 after the fault occurs. If we increase the level of discretization of the leader
angular position, the parity signal PI will change sooner after the presence of the
fault. This will reduce the delay of diagnosis. In general, ﬁner discretization may
also improve diagnosis accuracy. The price for faster or more accurate diagnosis,
however, is the higher complexity of the discrete event models.
Remark 2 - Spacecraft mass
In Eq. (4.2) we assumed that the moment of inertial of the spacecraft was constant
and we normalized its value to 1. If we considered variable moment of inertial for
the spacecraft, the generation of the parity signals and hence the diagnosis system
would remain the same.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we examined the proposed hybrid fault diagnosis scheme on a system
of Leader/Follower spacecraft in deep space with translation motion in one direction
and rotation around a axis perpendicular to translational motion using computer
simulations. As pointed out in the previous chapter, a formal test of diagnosability
is also available but requires extensive software development. This is left for future
work.
We described the system components and reviewed the dynamics of the system.
We then developed the DES model of the system. Parity signals were also formulated
from sensors output signals. Subsequently, the fault diagnoser was built based on
the system model and parity signals. We considered one normal scenario and four
fault scenarios for the system and investigated the performance of diagnoser for each
mode of operation. We also discussed how to isolate the faults by applying parity
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signals.
Our study was limited to one-dimensional motion with single-axis rotation for
a system whose dynamics is described in terms of simple integration. Therefore the
scope of our study as indeed limited. A discussion on possible future extensions is





In this thesis, we proposed an adaption of a framework for fault diagnosis of hy-
brid systems for teams of autonomous systems. The dynamics of hybrid systems are
characterized by a Discrete Event System (DES) representing transitions among var-
ious modes of operation, and a set of continuous models (i.e. diﬀerential equations)
describing the system’s behavior in the discrete modes. In a hybrid system, there
are usually two types of sensors: continuous sensors (generating continuous-time
readings) and discrete sensors (generating discrete outputs like ‘high’ and ‘low’).
Discrete outputs can be used for the diagnosis of drastic failures such as a stuck-oﬀ
actuator and continuous outputs can be used for the diagnosis of faults that slightly
change the system dynamics such as a small loss of eﬀectiveness in a sensor.
First, the DES model of the hybrid system is constructed based on the discrete
states of the system. A bank of residuals is then generated based on the continuous
models of the system to detect the faults. Then, we model these residuals by DES
and integrate them with the DES abstraction of the system to construct an extended
DES model. Finally, we use this extended model to build the fault diagnoser.
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In the fault diagnosis scheme proposed here for a team of autonomous sys-
tems, each member of the team has a local diagnoser and to reduce the amount of
communication between the team members, only discrete-event data are exchanged
among the local diagnosers.
The proposed fault diagnosis system is applied to a team of two spacecraft
in a Leader-Follower Formation Flying format. Each spacecraft has a set of four
thrusters, one accelerometer, one relative distance sensor and a gyroscope. We
assume that the leader and relative distance sensor are fault free while follower
thrusters, accelerometer and gyroscope may fail.
Our goal is to maintain their relative position and orientation at a desirable
range while detecting faults at the moment they occur. To minimize the communi-
cation between these two spacecraft, we keep the continuous information locally and
only communicate the discretized data to the other spacecraft. The fault diagnosis
for the follower is designed. A number of simulations for diﬀerent maneuvers were
conducted to demonstrate and verify the performance of our proposed hybrid fault
diagnoser.
5.2 Future Work
In the following, some of the possible extensions to the results obtained in this thesis
are presented.
• Formation Flying - In this work we ﬁrst considered a formation ﬂying of two
spacecraft with translation motion in one axis in Chapter 3. Then, we added
rotational movements around a ﬁxed axis in Chapter 4. We considered this
simple example to show the basic idea of our proposed method and examine
the performance of it in diﬀerent maneuvers. In general, in formation ﬂying,
the number of spacecraft is more than two and also they move in 3-dimensional
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space.
• Thrusters - In our work, we considered on/oﬀ thrusters with bang-bang control
as these were more suitable for our diagnosis method. If, for example, contin-
uous thrusters are suggested for an application, we should change the system’s
mathematical model to incorporate the continuous behavior of thrusters. This
will lead to a more computationally complex model and is left as a future work.
• Disturbance and Noise - We assumed that the system is disturbance and noise-
free. Investigating the performance of the proposed fault diagnosis method in
the presence of disturbance and noise and uncertainties in the system’s model
is also an interesting topic for future work.
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